Pages

Monday, October 17, 2011

Women in Democratic Republic of Afghanistan






--

http://www.scribd.com/doc/21693873/Indo-Pak-Wars-1947-71-A-STRATEGIC-AND-OPERATIONAL-ANALYSIS-BY-A-H-AMIN-THIS-BOOK-CAN-BE-PRINTED-FROM-THIS-SITE

Man would indeed be in a poor way if he had to be restrained by fear of punishment and hope of reward after death."  --
Albert Einstein !!!



Sunday, October 16, 2011

Debate on Mr Jinnahs Role in Kashmir War-Daily Times


Jinnah's role in the Kashmir War


Monday, February 15, 2010 


VIEW: Reassessing Liaquat Ali Khan's role —Riaz Shahid
Liaquat Ali Khan was the one to bring for the first time religion into politics. His alliance with the mullahs produced the 'Objectives Resolution', which declared Pakistan to be an 'Islamic state'. Common perception holds Zia or Bhutto responsible for mixing religion and politics, but it was Liaquat Ali Khan under whose leadership mullahs were given entry into politics and the right to decide the fate of the nation

Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan was the first prime minister and a founding father of Pakistan. Being the closest lieutenant of Quaid-e-Azam has given him a semi-divine status in Pakistani history. There is, to this date, very little objective assessment of his role as prime minister. I believe this is a folly since Liaquat Ali Khan lived a much longer time compared to Quaid-e-Azam after the birth of Pakistan, and his legacy still shapes Pakistan today in several critical areas.


First and foremost is the fact that Pakistan's disastrous constitutional history has much to do with Liaquat Ali Khan. He had no constituency in Pakistan. His hometown was left behind in India. Bengalis were a majority in the newly created state of Pakistan and this was a painful reality for him. While India was able to promulgate a constitution by 1950 and hold a first direct election on adult franchise in 1951, the Muslim League under Liaquat Ali Khan scrupulously avoided its responsibility to frame a constitution. The reason was simple. Had a constitution been framed, the Bengali demographic majority would have granted Bengalis political power and Liaquat Ali Khan would have been sent out of the prime minister's office. The person who would have replaced him would have been Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy, the most popular political leader of Bengali Muslims and a great stalwart of the freedom movement. He had been chief minister and head of a Muslim League government of United Bengal before partition. Of course, the West Pakistani political elites, particularly those of Punjab, were also against a permanent Bengali majority in the National Assembly. Had Liaquat Ali Khan ignored his personal political interests and respected the ground reality of the Bengali majority, Pakistan might have got itself a workable constitution 60 years back. He was in a position to ignore the Punjabi elites and do the right thing. The Pakistani army was in formative stages and was in no position to challenge civilian authority. All the service chiefs were British.


Liaquat Ali Khan was the one to bring for the first time religion into politics. His alliance with the mullahs produced the 'Objectives Resolution', which declared Pakistan to be an 'Islamic state'. Common perception holds Zia or Bhutto responsible for mixing religion and politics, but it was Liaquat Ali Khan under whose leadership mullahs were given entry into politics and the right to decide the fate of the nation.


Then there is Kashmir. During the initial stages of the Kashmir conflict, Sardar Patel, India's deputy prime minister, offered Pakistan to exchange Hyderabad Deccan for Kashmir. This fact is corroborated by a host of impeccable sources including Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, Liaquat's close confidant. The latter has described how this offer was made by the Indians in his masterly biography, The Emergence of Pakistan. Hyderabad Deccan was a gone case from day one. It was surrounded on all sides by the Indians and had a Hindu majority. Kashmir, on the other hand, was Pakistan's jugular vein and we should have aimed to get it by hook or crook.


Lastly, Liaquat Ali Khan paved the way for Pakistan's first military dictator. Ayub Khan was merely a colonel in 1947. Quaid-e-Azam had given orders that he will not wear wings for one year and will be transferred to East Pakistan forthwith due to his involvement in looting evacuee gold and silver. No less a person than Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar had written a report on Ayub Khan's misconduct. Ayub Khan's British superiors had given him a horrible ACR for his timidity and refusal to participate in combat in Burma in World War II. Had independence not come about, the British would have retired him early. Most importantly, Ayub Khan had not even taken part in the Kashmir war. Strangely, this bad service record was ignored by Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan who also happened to be Pakistan's first defence minister, and appointed Ayub Khan as Army Chief over two senior generals.


I do not deny that Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan played a tremendous role in the creation of Pakistan, but this does not mean that we deify him and not critically analyse his policies and actions.


The writer is a freelance columnist

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Saturday, March 06, 2010E-Mail this article to a friendPrinter Friendly Version


        
Comment: Ayub Khan's appointment Riaz Shahid
The fact that Pakistan got a person to lead its army who had no experience of commanding division level operations and had not participated in the Kashmir war ensured that during an actual battle, Pakistan Army's performance would be below the optimum

This is in response to Mr Gohar Ayub Khan's rejoinder 'Clarification', published in the 'Letters to the Editor' section (Daily Times, February18, 2010) in response to my article 'Reassessing Liaquat Ali Khan's role' (Daily Times, February15, 2010). In my article, I had deliberately not discussed AyubKhan's appointment as Pakistan's first native army chief as these details are quite painful, not to mention controversial. Now that Gohar Ayub Khan has decided to challenge my assertions, I have no choice but to bring all the facts to light.


Mr Gohar Ayub admits that Ayub Khan was a colonel in 1947. He gives the example of General JN Chaudhuri who was also a colonel in 1947 and went on to become the Indian army chief. The fact is that General JN Chaudhri did become the Chief of Army Staff of the Indian Army, but on November 19, 1962, full 11 years and 11 months after Ayub Khan became Pakistan's army chief! In his memoirs Glimpses into the Corridors of Power, Mr Gohar Ayub admits that his father was of the opinion that the rank of a full colonel was the most he could attain during British control.


The promotion from colonel to general in less than four years forAyub Khan had strategic consequences for Pakistan, as AyubKhan had neither attained the experience or the gravitas needed to do justice to the office of the Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan Army. His shortcomings became apparent during the 1965 Warinto which he had led the country, thanks to the ill thought and badly executed 'Operation Gibraltar'. Compare this to the Indian Army. Field Marshal Kodandera 'Kipper' Madappa Cariappa, who was its first native army chief, was the senior most Hindu officer serving in the British Indian Army on partition. He was the first Indian officer to be given command of a unit (by the British in 1942) in 200 years of the British Raj. For his military exploits against the Japanese as division commander of the 26th Division, Cariappa was given the Order of the British Empire (OBE). AyubKhan had the honour of serving under him as a colonel in the Frontier Brigade Group in 1946.


Gohar Ayub considers participation in Kashmir was inconsequential, deeming my assertion that Ayub Khan did not participate in the Kashmir war as 'ridiculous'. The Indians, however, think otherwise. Cariappa, as general officer commanding-in-chief of the Western Command in 1947-48, captured Zojilla, Dras, Kargil and Leh for India, and to this day the Indians worship him for that. On the other hand, what does Pakistan's first native commander-in-chief have to show for him in terms of gallantry awards or mention in despatches?


The fact that Pakistan got a person to lead its army who had no experience of commanding division level operations and had not participated in the Kashmir war ensured that during an actual battle, Pakistan Army's performance would be below the optimum and that operations in the Kashmir sector would be badly botched up. And that is exactly what happened during the 1965 War. The Indians, however, were lucky to get an army chief under whom the Indian Army had gotten its first baptism of fire.


What very few people know is that Ayub Khan was so junior at the time of independence that he was given Pakistan Army No10 (PA10) and was not selected to represent Pakistan in the partition council that was set up to divide the assets of the British Indian Army between the Pakistani and Indian armies. There were nine officers senior to him on August 14, 1947, amongst which there were at least five full brigadiers (Mohammad Akbar Khan, Muhammed Iftikhar Khan, Faiz Muhammad, Fazal-ur-Rehman Kallue, Nawabzada Agha Mohammad Raza). In his memoirs Friends Not Masters, Ayub clearly states, "A Council was then set up to divide the armed forces. We had Raza, Akbar and Latif on this council representing Pakistan...I had little direct connection with the division of the armed forces" (page 20).


Mr Gohar Ayub denies that the British gave Ayub Khan a horrible Annual Confidential Report (ACR) for timidity and refusal to participate in combat in Burma in World War II. Furthermore, he states, "Ayub Khan commanded 1st Assam Regiment from January 4 to December 27, 1945 in the Burma Campaign during which the battalion participated in heavy fighting till the Japanese surrender in mid-1945."


Both of the above claims made by him are false and untrue.Ayub Khan's timidity and refusal to participate in combat in World War II is an established fact. AH Amin and Dr Ayesha Siddiqa Agha, who are the only defence analysts and military historians in Pakistan of international stature, testify to this. Reviewing Shuja Nawaz's book on Pakistan Army, Crossed Swords, in Newsline magazine in August 2008, Dr Ayesha states, "In fact, he completely ignores the information that Ayub Khan had received a bad ACR from his bosses prior to the partition of India and had become a general through machination." Furthermore, there are written testimonies in this regard from Lieutenant Colonel Parson and Lieutenant Colonel Mohatram who served in the same unit as Ayub Khan in Burma. The former in his presentation, 'Battle of Kohima', in 1984 categorically stated that, "Ayub Khan refused to command the regiment on the grounds that its men were no longer fit to carry on the battle and that he requested that he be sent back to India." Lieutenant Colonel Parson's revelations were published in the Daily Telegraph of Calcutta as well in Daily News of Karachi on April 28, 1984. From here the story gets really weird. Major General Joginder Singh, who was Ayub Khan's battalion mate, asserts in his book Behind the Scenes (1993) that Ayub Khan was not considered fit to command his parent Punjab Regiment and was relegated to serving in Chamar Regiment, which was disbanded after the war ended. The point is that Ayub Khan did not serve in the prestigious Assam Regiment, which Gohar Ayubclaims he did! For more on this issue and on Quaid-e-Azam's order to transfer and freeze Ayub Khan's career, I recommend the readers to read Major General Sher Ali's The Story of Soldiering and Politics in India and Pakistan, Air Commodore Sajjad Haider's Flight of the Falcon and Hasan Abbas's Pakistan's Drift into Extremism.


I hope that these facts set the record straight for the benefit of Daily Times' readers.


The writer is a freelance columnist. He can be reached atblazinggun25@yahoo.com
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DAILY TIMES---Tuesday, March 16, 2010
view: The 1947-48 Kashmir War —Ishtiaq Ahmed
Take up any book published in Pakistan on the division of the common assets of the Indian Royal Armed Forces and you will find Pakistan, justifiably, claiming that it was not given a fair share of the tanks, guns and ammunition and so on

I was quite intrigued by the 
convoluted reasoning underpinning Riaz Shahid's op-ed, 'Reassessing Liaquat Ali Khan's role' (Daily Times, February 15, 2010). In it he assailed Liaquat Ali Khan for a number of wrong decisions, among which one that generated controversy was the allegation that he appointed Ayub Khan as Pakistan's army chief when the latter had allegedly been given very bad references for timidity and lack of leadership during World War II when he was posted on the Burmese Front; more damning than that was, according to Riaz Shahid, Ayub's absence from the Kashmir War. The lack of battle experience, argues the author, rendered him unfit to be promoted as the highest soldier of Pakistan.


Since I am in the process of completing a book on the role of the Pakistan military in Pakistani politics, I have had to go through the literature on the Kashmir War as well. I must say that with or without Ayub Khan's participation, initiating hostilities in Kashmir cost us that state. Mian Iftikharuddin, Faiz Ahmed Faiz and Dr MD Taseer had been tasked to woo Sheikh Abdullah over to the Pakistani point of view on Kashmir. They gave up in despair when scores of tribal warriors backed by Pakistani regulars and irregulars entered Kashmir in the last week of October to liberate it from Dogra rule.


The tribal warriors quickly forgot the mission they were supposed to achieve, and succumbed prey to a vice deeply rooted in their culture and history — looting, pillaging and raping. Among their victims were some European nuns, presumably engaged in meditation and helping the poor. Why some of our senior officers could not keep such characters under control is of course another matter, but Kashmiri opinion quickly turned against the infiltrators. The rape of the nuns brought along international disapprobation and condemnation. 


The tribal warriors had no clue that something called the Accession Bill privileged the rulers of princely states to determine their state's relationship with India and Pakistan. That Pakistani officers and jawans were also oblivious of the same is rather astounding. The fact is that even Quaid-e-Azam did not realise the great folly in going into Kashmir. There is overwhelming evidence to suggest that he had instructed a number of ministers to help the 'freedom fighters' whereas Liaquat and some others were lukewarm in their support. This difference of opinion in the central cabinet comes out clearly in Major (retd) Agha Humayun Amin's book on the Pakistan Army to which Riaz Shahid has referred in his above-mentioned essay.


But here are some arguments to prove that the Kashmir War actually set in motion a process that diminished our claim on Kashmir. Maharaja Hari Singh Dogra had no intention of merging his state with either India or Pakistan. The Pakistan-sponsored insurgency forced him to choose sides. The Indian emissary, VP Menon, arrived in Srinagar with a document that stipulated Indian military help only if the Maharaja signed the Accession Bill. There is some dispute as to the actual date on which it was signed, but the document that the Indians have in their possession gives October 26 as the date on which it was signed. 


At that time the British officers were holding commanding positions on both sides. The only reason some of them stayed behind was to ensure that these two states were not dragged into an armed conflict with each other; another reason was to train and groom them to become part of the grand Commonwealth reservoir of troops, which Britain deluded itself into believing will still be its role in South Asia for a long, long time to come. It is clearly stated in the 12th and last volume (1983) of the Transfer of Power that the British government has released on the partition of India that British officers who agreed to serve in India and Pakistan were under clear instructions not to fight in case war broke out between these two states.


Even more importantly, it is now time to wonder if our leaders acted responsibly in opening a front in Kashmir when more than 14 million people had been uprooted, some 1-2 million killed — of which at least half of the fatalities were that of Muslims — in the rioting, and hundreds of thousands of women abducted by men from the 'enemy religions'. Pakistan was on the verge of bankruptcy. In 1948, the Pakistani international border with India was as vulnerable — in fact infinitely much more — as in 1965. 


Take up any book published in Pakistan on the division of the common assets of the Indian Royal Armed Forces and you will find Pakistan, justifiably, claiming that it was not given a fair share of the tanks, guns and ammunition and so on. Had the Indians opened the front at Lahore or Sialkot in 1948 as they did in 1965, our bluff would have been called forthwith.


The fact remains that the British Acting Commander-in-Chief, General Gracey (the C-in-C General Messervy was away on leave) did not let down Pakistan by dissuading Jinnah to let the conflict escalate. He did a favour. This does not sound very patriotic, but as a scholar I must speak the truth. The 1947-48 Kashmir was a much more irresponsible adventure than the one that was initiated in 1965.


In August 1965, infiltrators were despatched into India. They were able to report some spectacular successes though the evidence now tells a story of both advances and reverses. The Indians opened the front along the Punjab border on September 6. For a few days our armed forces fought with great courage and determination, but so did the Indians. After a few days, we had run out of spare parts, ammunition and armaments. The situation on the other side was perhaps not any better. 


On our side this happened even when for almost a decade we had been recipients of state-of-the-art US military aid and training. In 1948 we were poorly armed and proper training and organisation were absent. It would have not made an iota of a difference if Ayub had fought in 1947-48 and gained battle hardiness. Such romantic phraseology is totally unwarranted. It only perpetuates a vain myth that the Pakistan military is some invincible fighting machine and the fault lies in some generals.


Ishtiaq Ahmed is a Visiting Research Professor at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS) and the South Asian Studies Programme at the National University of Singapore. He is also Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Stockholm University. He has published extensively on South Asian politics. At ISAS, he is currently working on a book, Is Pakistan a Garrison State? He can be reached at isasia@nus.edu.sg
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wednesday, March 24, 2010E-Mail this article to a friend Printer Friendly Version


Share this story!  del.icio.us digg Reddit Furl Fark TailRank Ma.gnolia NewsVine Simpy Spurl 
COMMENT: Jinnah's role in the Kashmir War —Yasser Latif Hamdani
The issue of whether Jinnah knew about it is a contentious one, primarily because there is no evidence, let alone 'overwhelming' one, of Jinnah's knowledge of the tribal invasion. On the contrary, the evidence as well as consensus amongst the majority of the students of the Kashmir dispute is that Jinnah was entirely ignorant of the tribal invasion till at least October 10, 1947

In his article 'The 1947-48 
Kashmir War' (Daily Times, March 16, 2010), Dr Ishtiaq Ahmed has insinuated that there is overwhelming evidence that Jinnah not only knew about but was instrumental in the organisation of the invasion of Kashmir led by General Akbar Khan.


In this, Dr Ahmed claims to have relied on Major (retired) Agha Humayun Amin's History of the Pakistan Army, though that book itself makes no such claim nor cites any overwhelming evidence. The chapter on Kashmir War does, however, praise Jinnah for his "leadership" in the war and for his "initiative". Major (retired) Amin waxes eloquent about how Jinnah was a great leader — a rock even — of men, who might have wrested Kashmir had he on his side a Patel, which Nehru in India was lucky to have.


These glowing left-handed tributes to Jinnah's decisive leadership on the Kashmir issue seem quite out of place when one considers that Jinnah's direct orders for mobilisation of the Pakistan Army were defied by the first Commander-in-Chief, General Gracey, and Jinnah had no choice but to back down. Any biographer of the man will tell you that Jinnah's greatness was never in any real superhuman strength but his ability to project invincibility where there was none. He was always the poker player dealt repeatedly a bad hand by fate. This is what makes Jinnah one of the most fascinating characters in modern history.


The issue of whether Jinnah knew about it is a contentious one, primarily because there is no evidence, let alone 'overwhelming' one, of Jinnah's knowledge of the tribal invasion. On the contrary, the evidence as well as consensus amongst the majority of the students of the Kashmir dispute is that, sitting in Karachi in the first two months of Pakistan's creation, Jinnah was entirely ignorant of the tribal invasion till at least October 10, 1947, when it was officially underway in the north.


Here it is pertinent to quote Alastair Lamb, the author of Incomplete Partition, who says on page 137 of this book: "What part had the government of Pakistan to play in this venture into the military venture into the state of Jammu and Kashmir?...The Governor General, M A Jinnah was kept ignorant of all the details, though naturally he was aware that there was trouble of some sort brewing in Kashmir, and the Pakistan cabinet did not take a minuted stance."


Fatima Jinnah confirms this as well. Sorraya Khurshid, the wife of K H Khurshid and sister to Khalid Hasan, writes in her book Memories of Fatima Jinnah on page 87 that Fatima Jinnah told her that Jinnah had no clue about the tribal invasion. She is quoted as saying, "In fact, he did not know anything about it [Kashmir attack by tribals] at all and was very sorry that a thoughtless step had been taken in such a crude and unorganised manner."


George Cunningham also seconds the view that Jinnah was unaware of the tribal invasion till very late. He is quoted in the book Sir George Cunningham: A Memoir (Blackwood, 1968), on page 140 as saying: "On October 25, Colonel Iskandar Mirza arrived from Lahore. He told me all the underground history of the present campaign against Kashmir, and brought apologies from Liaquat Ali for not letting me know anything about it sooner. Liaquat had meant to come here last week and tell me about it personally but was prevented by his illness...Apparently Jinnah himself first heard of what was going on about 15 days ago, but said, 'Don't tell me anything about it. My conscience must be clear'...It was decided apparently about a month ago that the Poonchis should revolt and should be helped. Abdul Qayyum was in it from the beginning."


The issue to my mind is an academic one. It is quite possible that despite all the evidence pointing to the contrary, Jinnah was in complete control and was organising the insurgency sitting in Karachi. However, the issue at hand is how historical inaccuracies are invented and then recycled by academics who use their credentials to hedge all criticism levelled at them for glaring omissions or inaccuracies in their work. Dr Ahmed's piece has now been quoted by many armchair generals in the great war of history being waged in the sewers of that monstrosity humanity has invented for itself called the web.


The fact is that Dr Ahmed had no basis to claim "overwhelming evidence" whatsoever. His entire reliance was on one book that only praises Jinnah's role as the "Father of the Pakistan Army" (actually Jinnah may only be termed as the father of the Indian Army given his role in the founding of Dehradun Military Academy in India) and implies that because he was a man in control, he could not have been in the dark. Major (retired) Amin credits Jinnah for having gotten Pakistan what little Kashmir Pakistan has today whereas Dr Ahmed uses the same to argue that Jinnah had planned the ill-advised invasion of Kashmir.


Both contentions fly in the face of reality however. Jinnah had little or no interest in military matters beyond a political angle — he had campaigned for the Indianisation of the army as an Indian nationalist leader and after Pakistan was created, he had reversed the age-old martial race theory by forming Bengali regiments. Perhaps somewhat exaggerated, but not entirely off the mark, American scholar Stephen Cohen writes in The Idea of Pakistan: "Jinnah cared little for military matters — he told the first commander-in-chief of the Pakistan Army, Sir Douglas Gracey, to run things together with Liaquat Ali Khan" (page 102).


To be fair though, Jinnah tried to assert himself when he ordered the Pakistan Army to mobilise against the Indian Army's movement towards Srinagar, but he was dissuaded from doing so by what can legally only be called 'mutiny' and nothing else. It would be fair to say that had the Pakistan Army moved at that time, the Kashmir dispute would have been resolved in one fair blow. Dr Ishtiaq Ahmed's contention that India would have opened a front at Sialkot as they did in 1965 is also erroneous. As the former Kashmiri Prime Minister Mehr Chand Mahajan's book shows clearly, the document of accession was not signed till the Indian troops were firmly on ground in Srinagar. Swift action then would have saved both Pakistan and India considerable heartbreak that has come their way due to protracted conflict.


---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan

View: Did Jinnah know about the Kashmir War? —Ishtiaq Ahmed

Those who want us to believe that an obscure colonel forced Pakistan into a war without the knowledge of the top political leadership, especially someone of the stature of Jinnah, are insulting common sense.


In his comment, ‘Jinnah’s role in the Kashmir War’ (Daily Times, March 24, 2010) on my op-ed a week earlier, ‘The 1947-48 Kashmir War’ (Daily Times, March 16, 2010), Yasser Latif Hamdani writes:“There is no evidence, let alone ‘overwhelming’ one, of Jinnah’s knowledge of the tribal invasion.” In the next paragraph he quotes Alastair Lamb who writes, “The Governor General, M A Jinnah was kept ignorant of all the details, though naturally he was aware that there was trouble of some sort brewing in Kashmir...” Lamb speaks about Jinnah being kept ignorant about details, not about the event itself.

The relevant portion from NWFP Governor George Cunningham’s quote Hamdani invokes strengthens the inference I draw above. Cunningham remarked, “Apparently Jinnah himself heard first heard of what was going on about 15 days ago, but said, ‘Don’t tell me anything about it. My conscience must be clear’.” In plain English, one can only read it to mean that Jinnah did not want others to know that he knew about the Kashmir campaign. Hamdani calculates that Jinnah first learnt about it around October 10, 1947. That means 14 days before “tribal warriors backed by Pakistani regulars and irregulars entered Kashmir in the last week of October”, as I wrote earlier. Fourteen days is long enough to put a stop to a misadventure. It was distinctly separate from the uprising in Poonch in August that comprised mainly Poonchis who had served in the Indian and Kashmir armies. The issue at debate is the invasion that started on October 24, 1947, that precipitated the decision of the Maharaja to accede to India. The events that preceded it are not relevant.

Hamdani claims that Major (retired) Agha Humayun Amin makes no claim about Jinnah being in the know about the Kashmir tribal incursion. In his book, The Pakistan Army till 1965 (1999), Amin writes, “The Muslim League’s high command had tasked Mian Iftikharuddin, Minister for Refugees, to prepare a plan aimed at ensuring that the Muslim majority state of Kashmir should join Pakistan. Brigadier Akbar Khan then serving in the Pakistan GHQ wrote an appreciation ‘armed revolt inside Kashmir’ on Mian Iftikharuddin’s request. It appears that Mr Jinnah had tasked Iftikharuddin to plan/handle the Kashmir business” (p 89). Further down, Amin talks of three principal parties that were involved in the whole invasion affair. Of the three, “One side was the Muslim League leaders like Shaukat Hayat (an ex-major), Iftikharuddin and Khurshid Anwar who had been ordered by Mr Jinnah to do something to help the Kashmiri Muslims...” (p 89).

Later Amin writes, “It may be noted that Mr Jinnah had ordered General Gracey the British Acting C-in-C...to attack Kashmir.” Gracey refused because Field Marshal Auchinleck, who was the Supreme Commander of both India and Pakistan, overruled British officers to take part in a war between India and Pakistan. Amin goes on to develop an argument that the Kashmir war was winnable. That is the opinion of a military officer and an author. One need not concur with that.

Hamdani latches on to Amin’s belief in victory in Kashmir and makes this interesting remark, “Jinnah tried to assert himself when he ordered [on October 24 or 25, 1947] the Pakistan Army to mobilise against the Indian Army’s movement towards Srinagar, but he was dissuaded from doing so by what can legally only be called ‘mutiny’ and nothing else.” How very interesting and original indeed! Instead of charging Gracey with mutiny, Jinnah promoted him as Pakistan’s second commander-in-chief in February 1948, which is several months after he allegedly mutinied. Gracey was C-in-C till 1951 when Ayub Khan took over.

Professor Ayesha Jalal has the Kashmir war in her book, The State of Martial Law: The Origins of Pakistan’s Political Economy of Defence (1990). She observes: “One has perforce to conclude that the government of Pakistan with the connivance of the Frontier ministry was actively promoting the sentiments that had encouraged the tribesmen to invade Kashmir. Admittedly, the Pakistani leadership refrained from officially committing the army in Kashmir. But they did so because of the severe shortage of arms and ammunition, not because this was the preferred course of action. If they had been in a position to do so, the Muslim League leaders, with Jinnah’s blessings, would have thrown in the army behind the tribal effort...The commander-in-chief of the Azad forces was a Pakistani army officer, colonel Mohammad Akbar, who went under the pseudonym of ‘General Tariq’ [legendary conqueror of Spain in the 8th century] and was known to be in close contact with Qayum Khan and through him with Jinnah and the League leaders in Karachi” (pp 58-9).

Hamdani and others who want us to believe that an obscure colonel forced Pakistan into a war without the knowledge of the top political leadership, especially someone of the stature of Jinnah, are insulting common sense. If that were true, then why did Jinnah not order Akbar Khan to be tried for gross insubordination that was tantamount to treachery? Akbar Khan should have been court-martialled. He was not, because he had acted only after clearance from the very top. Before he became really ill in June 1948, Jinnah exercised real power and authority and made key decisions. Liaquat Ali Khan was practically his sidekick.

In April 1948, Gracey was convinced by Jinnah to send troops into Kashmir. By that time some arms had been procured from Britain, writes Brian Cloughley in his book, A History of the Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections (2000). Thus officially Pakistan and India were at war from April 21, 1948. Cloughley notes that May 1948 onwards, India began to enjoy the upper hand, but the war remained stalemated with neither side scoring victory (pp 20-21). Major-General (retired) Shaukat Riza reached the same conclusion, that neither side could win the war in Kashmir in his book, The Pakistan Army 1947-1949 (1989). Under the circumstances, it was not extended to Punjab, but would have had India felt it needed to checkmate Pakistan. That is what I concluded in my previous article.

Jinnah was a poker player who projected invincibility even when he was dealt a bad hand by fate, asserts Hamdani. It is a peculiar way to sum up Jinnah’s politics, to say the least. I am convinced that if the Kashmir gamble had succeeded, Miss Jinnah, Soraya Khurshid, Yasser Hamdani and many others would have described it as yet another marvellous poker gambit of Jinnah. Our heroes never make a wrong move. If they do we feign ignorance about it.


--
Man would indeed be in a poor way if he had to be restrained by fear of punishment and hope of reward after death."  --
Albert Einstein !!!

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22151765/History-of-Pakistan-Army-from-1757-to-1971

http://www.scribd.com/doc/21693873/Indo-Pak-Wars-1947-71-A-STRATEGIC-AND-OPERATIONAL-ANALYSIS-BY-A-H-AMIN

http://www.scribd.com/doc/21686885/TALIBAN-WAR-IN-AFGHANISTAN

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22455178/Letters-to-Command-and-Staff-College-Quetta-Citadel-Journal

http://www.scribd.com/doc/23150027/Pakistan-Army-through-eyes-of-Pakistani-Generals

http://www.scribd.com/doc/23701412/War-of-Independence-of-1857

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22457862/Pakistan-Army-Journal-The-Citadel

http://www.scribd.com/doc/21952758/1971-India-Pakistan-War

http://www.scribd.com/doc/25171703/BOOK-REVIEWS-BY-AGHA-H-AMIN

Tuesday, October 4, 2011

The fallacy of mixing religion with military leadership



CRITIQUE OF AN ARTICLE MIXING RELIGION WITH LEADERSHIP


Complete letter may be downloaded from the following URL


http://www.scribd.com/doc/22455178/Letters-to-Command-and-Staff-College-Quetta-Citadel-Journal


For actual letters as they were published in the Citadel Journal see the following URL--




http://www.scribd.com/doc/28266915/Letters-to-Editor-as-Published-After-Censorship-in-Pakistan-Army-Journal-and-Citadel


This is the leadership seminar of the command and staff college Quetta of 1991.


I was commanding an independent tank squadron in Okara and amused as well as surprised that many top of the line Pakistani officers found the Christian and other non Muslim societies as having inferior leadership traditions.This actually was a serious cognitive fallacy and a distorted view of leadership.


Thus I wrote the letters below.
click on pictures to read

CRITIQUE OF THEN LIEUTENANT COLONEL SHAHID AZIZ (LATER LIEUTENANT GENERAL) BY MAJOR AGHA HUMAYUN AMIN .THE GENERAL HAD MADE SOME SWEAPING STATEMENTS ABOUT LEADERSHIP IN HIS ARTICLE LEADERSHIP AN ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUE






CLICK ON THE PICTURES BELOW TO SEE THE LETTERS AS THEY WERE ACTUALLY PUBLISHED IN COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE QUETTAS CITADEL JOURNAL